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This Article examines whether the cost of complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX) contributed to the rise in going-private transactions after its enactment.
Prior studies of this issue generally suffer from a mistaken assumption that by going-
private, a publicly traded firm necessarily immunizes itself from SOX. In actuality, the
need to finance a going-private transaction often requires firms to issue high-yield debt
securities that subject the surviving firm to SEC reporting obligations and, as a conse-
quence, most of the substantive provisions of SOX. This Article thus explores a previously
unexamined natural experiment: to the extent SOX contributed to the rise in going-
private transactions, one should observe after 2002 a transition away from high-yield debt
in the financing of going-private transactions towards other forms of"SOX-free"finance.
Using a unique dataset of going-private transactions, this Article examines the
financing decisions of 468 going-private transactions occurring in the eight-year period
surrounding the enactment of SOX. Although SOX-free forms of subordinated debt-
financing were widely available during this period, I find no significant change in the
overall rate at which firms used high-yield debt financing in structuring going-private
transactions after SOX was enacted. Cross-sectional analysis, however, reveals that the
use of high-yield financing marginally declined after 2002 for small- and medium-sized
transactions, while significantly increasing for large-sized transactions. These findings
are consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of SOX have disproportionately bur-
dened small firms. They also strongly suggest that non-SOX factors were the primary
impetus for the "name brand" buyouts commonly evoked as evidence that SOX has
harmed the competitiveness of US capital markets.
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INTRODUCTION
I'd say on Sarbanes ... [ift's probably been the best thing that's hap-
pened to our business [as a private-equity firm] and one of the
worst things that's happened to America.... I find corporate man-
agers more or less quite defeated by Sarbanes. I think it's taken a lot
of the entrepreneurial zeal out of a lot of corporate managers, and
as a result of that, when we talk to them about going private, they're
really quite excited about it.
- Stephen Schwarzman,
Chairman, CEO, and Co-founder,
The Blackstone Group LP'
Since its enactment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has
engendered a vigorous debate concerning whether the post-SOX in-
crease in the cost of being a public company has harmed the competi-
tiveness of US capital markets. Of particular importance in this debate
has been the remarkable growth since 2002 in "going-private" transac-
tions-in general terms, the acquisition of a publicly traded firm by a
privately held firm. As documented by the nonpartisan Committee on
Capital Markets Regulation, going-private transactions have grown
steadily since the enactment of SOX, comprising 25 percent of all public
takeovers in 2004, over twice the level of pre-SOX going-private trans-
actions.3 Not surprisingly, for many commentators and policy analysts
the conclusion that the costs of SOX have contributed to the surge in
going-private activity has been difficult to resist.'
1 Interview by Maria Bartiromo with Stephen Schwarzman and David Rubinstein, The Charlie
Rose Show 5 (PBS May 1, 2006), online at httpJ/www.charlierose.comlviewfmterview/430 (visited Jan
11,2009).
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, codified at 15 USC § 7201
et seq.
3 See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report 34-35 (Nov 30,2006), online
at httpJ/www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.3OCommittee-Interim-ReportREV2.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009)
("Capital Markets Report") (documenting the increase of going-private transactions as a percen-
tage of all public takeovers).
4 See, for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Will the SEC's and PCAOB's New Stan-
dards Lower Compliance Costs for Small Companies?, Hearings before the House Small Business
Committee, 110th Cong, 1st Sess, 94 (June 5, 2007) (statement of Hal S. Scott, on behalf of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation), online at http.//frwebgate.access~gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=110_househearings&docid=f:36101.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) ("One of the reasons
for the increasing attractiveness of private equity markets is concern over the costs of going or
remaining public."); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony
of "Going Private," 55 Emory L J 141,142, 153-59 (2006) (arguing that SOX in general, and § 404
in particular, is "the principal factor in increased costs" faced by publicly traded firms, resulting
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Notwithstanding this conventional wisdom, academic studies of
the relationship between SOX and the rise in going-private transactions
have struggled with two significant problems. First, prior studies have
had difficulty controlling for other factors that could have affected
firms' decisions to go private following the enactment of SOX.' In par-
ticular, the corporate scandals that ushered in SOX contributed to a
variety of economic developments after 2002-such as a marked reduc-
tion in financial market liquidity and a prolonged period of depressed
stock prices-that have traditionally been associated with firms' deci-
sions to delist their equity securities. Likewise, firms also may have
been influenced by other non-SOX regulatory developments after 2002,
such as heightened criminal prosecution against publicly traded firms
and their executives, together with a significant increase in the size of
settlement payments related to class action shareholder lawsuits.6
More significantly, prior studies have assumed that in choosing to
go private, a publicly traded firm necessarily becomes immune from
the compliance burdens imposed by SOX. In actuality, firms going pri-
vate frequently remain subject to SOX's compliance costs owing to the
fundamental need to finance a going-private transaction. Specifically,
unless a firm can finance a transaction with cash on hand or private
bank debt, it will often have to turn to high-yield debt markets to fund
a portion of the transaction costs. Indentures for high-yield notes, how-
ever, have long required issuers to file periodic reports with the SEC,
which after 2002 effectively requires issuers to comply with SOX given
that most of its provisions have been formally incorporated into the
periodic reports themselves. As a result, many of the buyouts frequently
cited to illustrate how SOX has driven companies to go private-such
as those of Toys "R" Us, Neiman Marcus, and HCA-have actually re-
sulted in private companies that continue to comply with SOX (includ-
ing, most notably, § 404's internal controls requirement).
To avoid these problems, this Article turns to a previously unexa-
mined natural experiment to test the hypothesis that the compliance
in the steady rise of going-private transactions between 2002 and 2005); John Thain, Sarbanes-
Oxley: Is the Price Too High? Wall St J A20 (May 27,2004) ("[A] fifth of U.S. public corporations
are considering going private because of the costs of governance regulations."); Larry Ribstein,
Market vs. Regulatory Reponses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
28 J Corp L 1, 39 (2002) ("Sarbanes-Oxley's enhanced disclosure and other requirements effec-
tively impose a tax on public ownership of stock. Firms can avoid this tax by buying their shares
and 'going private,' thereby freeing themselves of 1934 Act reporting requirements.").
5 See Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion of
Evidence from Event Returns and Going-private Decisions, 44 J Acct & Econ 146,161,163-64 (2007).
6 In addition to the enhanced regulatory burden facing public companies after SOX, the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation also cited enhanced liability risk as a principal cause for
the apparent diminished competitiveness of US capital markets. See Capital Markets Report at 5
(cited in note 3).
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costs of SOX have caused firms to go private. In particular, the fact
that a high-yield debt offering results in ongoing SEC reporting obli-
gations provides a unique opportunity to examine, in isolation from
other factors that might have contributed to the decision to go private,
how firms that went private viewed SOX's additional compliance bur-
dens. Regardless of why particular firms went private, if firms viewed
the compliance costs of SOX as excessive, the enactment of SOX
should have resulted in a decrease in the incidence of going-private
transactions funded with high-yield debt in favor of other forms of
"SOX-free" finance. The hypothesis is made all the more tenable giv-
en that at approximately the same time that SOX increased the cost of
issuing high-yield debt, innovations in the market for private debt in-
struments resulted in an explosion in the availability of second-lien
loans and mezzanine debt, which are not subject to SOX.
Using a unique dataset of going-private transactions, I provide the
first systematic analysis of the extent to which going-private firms have
remained SEC reporting companies on account of high-yield debt fi-
nancing surrounding the enactment of SOX. Consistent with prior ana-
lyses, I find a sharp increase in the rate at which publicly traded com-
panies have gone private since SOX was enacted. The data presented
here also reveal, however, that the overall rate at which these compa-
nies have elected to remain SEC reporting companies due to the use of
high-yield debt financing has remained largely unchanged from the
period prior to SOX. Indeed, for large going-private transactions, the
rate at which formerly publicly traded companies have remained SEC
reporting companies after going private has significantly increased since
SOX's enactment. It is only when one controls for this greater inci-
dence of high-yield debt financing among large going-private transac-
tions that it becomes possible to detect a marginal decrease after SOX
in the likelihood that a publicly traded company opting to go private
will remain an SEC reporting company following the transaction.
This Article makes two contributions to the growing literature on
SOX and going-private transactions. First, to date this is the only Ar-
ticle on SOX that expressly grapples with the fact that in going private,
firms have a choice about whether to remain subject to its provisions. In
so doing, it corrects a significant bias in prior studies that equate going
private with exemption from SOX and provides considerable evidence
that the wave of large-scale buyouts that swept the US economy dur-
ing 2003 to 2007 was not driven by the costs of SOX.
Second, this Article provides a unique insight into how participants
in a sophisticated, largely unregulated capital market view the disclo-
sure obligations of SOX. Although frequently criticized for mandating a
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rigid, one-size-fits-all approach to corporate fraud detection,' SOX does
not by its terms apply to the issuance and trading of high-yield debt.
Rather, it is through indenture covenants-an instrument of private
ordering-that high-yield investors and issuers have subjected them-
selves to its provisions. As such, this Article provides an important coun-
terpoint to those studies documenting the inefficiencies of SOX;' in some
markets, SOX may actually represent an efficient disclosure regime.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides
an overview of going-private financing structures, followed by an expla-
nation of how SOX can apply to firms that go private when these firms
finance a going-private transaction with high-yield debt. Part II devel-
ops the hypothesis that going-private transactions should migrate away
from high-yield debt financing after 2002 given the costs of SOX com-
pliance and the abundance of other forms of "SOX-free" debt financ-
ing. Part III tests this hypothesis by presenting evidence of the rate at
which firms have gone private but have remained public reporting com-
panies both before and after the enactment of SOX on account of the
use of high-yield debt financing.
I. BACKGROUND: GOING-PRIVATE FINANCING AND SOX
A. An Overview of Going-private Financing
Although going-private transactions can be structured in a variety
of ways, they most commonly result when a private firm uses cash to
acquire the publicly held stock of a publicly traded company. Often, the
7 Consider Ribstein, 28 J Corp L at 3 (cited in note 4) (arguing that, even with all their
imperfections, "contract and market-based approaches are more likely than [SOX] to reach
efficient results" in fraud detection and prevention).
8 See, for example, Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Compa-
nies Cross-listed in the US, 13 J Corp Fm 195,196 (2007) (documenting significant, negative abnor-
mal returns associated with the enactment of SOX on cross-listed foreign companies that are
subject to its provisions, especially for those companies that are located in jurisdictions having
relatively strong corporate governance laws).
9 Although going-private transactions have been the subject of countless studies, analyses
differ on exactly what it means to "go private." The conceptual confusion no doubt arises from
the fact that what we conventionally call a "public" company has two public characteristics. First,
its equity securities will be traded on either a national securities exchange or electronic trading
platform, and, second, the company will be subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), Pub L No 73-291,48 Stat 881, codified as
amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq. Studies of going-private transactions tend to be inconsistent
with regard to which one of these characteristics matters for purposes of distinguishing a public
company from a private company, and consequently, what it means to go from being "public" to
"private." For instance, most studies of going-private transactions have focused on whether the
equity securities of a publicly traded company are acquired by a private firm, generally ignoring
whether the surviving company might still be subject to the Exchange Act periodic reporting
requirements. See, for example, Kenneth Lehn and Annette Poulsen, Free Cash Flow and Stock-
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acquiring company is simply a preexisting private company (generally
referred to as a strategic buyer) that merges the operations of the two
firms. In other cases, the acquiring company is a newly formed shell
corporation created for the sole purpose of merging with a public com-
pany and buying out its public stockholders. In this latter situation, the
actual buyer is typically one or more private-equity firms or private
investors (generally referred to as financial buyers) who form the ac-
quisition corporation for the sole purpose of executing the transaction.
Whether initiated by a strategic or financial buyer, going-private
transactions entail buying out a target company's public shareholders,
thus making it imperative for a buyer to identify a source of acquisition
financing. For financial buyers, the need for external financing is par-
ticularly acute given that the newly formed acquisition company will
ordinarily have no preexisting business or assets on which to draw. For
example, in a typical leveraged buyout (LBO) sponsored by a private-
equity firm, the private-equity sponsor will generally secure financing
holder Gains in Going Private Transactions, 44 J Fin 771,771 n 1 (1989) ("In going private trans-
actions, shareholders of a publicly held corporation are bought out, typically at a large premium,
by a bidder who takes a concentrated ownership position in a reconstituted, privately held
firm."). Others, however, have focused on whether a publicly traded company ceases to file
reports with the SEC, even though the company's stock might continue to trade publicly in the
over-the-counter bulletin board or "Pink Sheets." See, for example, Stanley B. Block, The Latest
Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study, 14 J Applied Fin 36, 40-43 (Spring/Summer
2004) (examining a sample of going-private firms that ceased to be subject to the Exchange Act
reporting requirements because of either a merger, reverse stock split, self-tender offer, or volun-
tary deregistration under the Exchange Act). In general, because a company's obligation to file
reports with the SEC will cease if each class of securities is held by fewer than three hundred
recordholders, this latter category of studies will include companies that are acquired by private
companies as well as companies that otherwise reduce below three hundred their number of
recordholders (for example, through a reverse stock split or self-tender offer). Still others have
defined a going-private transaction as any transaction subject to the SEC's "going-private" regu-
lations set forth in Regulation 13e-3. This last category of studies represents something of a
middle-ground approach in that 13e-3 transactions include public companies acquired by private
companies (but only so long as the acquiring company is affiliated with the public target pur-
suant to Rule 13e-3) as well as companies that reduce the number of record stockholders below
three hundred, thereby terminating the companies' SEC reporting obligations. See Ellen Engel,
Rachel M. Hayes, and Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going Private Decisions,
44 J Acct & Econ 116,117-18 (2007); Carney, 55 Emory L J at 149 (cited in note 4).
This Article adopts the traditional definition of a going-private transaction as an acquisition
of a publicly traded company by a private company given that most analyses of the relationship
between SOX and going-private transactions either use this definition explicitly or implicitly by
relying on Form 13e-3 filings. Compare, for example, Capital Markets Report at 34-35 (cited in
note 3) (using this definition explicitly); Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric Talley,
Going-private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-country Analysis, 25 J L,
Econ, & Org (forthcoming 2009) (same), with Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 44 J Acct & Econ at 117-18
(using this definition implicitly); Carney, 55 Emory L J at 149 (cited in note 4). In contrast to
prior studies, however, this Article addresses directly the difficulties of using this definition to
analyze the effects of SOX on going-private transactions-namely, that public targets may still
be subject to the Exchange Act reporting obligations after an acquisition, and consequently, to
most of the provisions of SOX.
[76:7
2009] Going Private but Staying Public
from two main sources: (1) cash contributions from the private-equity
firm itself and the company's future managers, and (2) the cash
proceeds from one or more loans made to the acquisition company.
These two sources of acquisition financing-equity contributions and
loan proceeds-are then used to fund the purchase of the target's shares
from its shareholders, often by means of a merger. ' See Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1
TYPICAL LBO STRUCTURE
equi equity ca .sh
loans New Reverse Target
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At first blush, a strategic bidder might appear to have less of a
need to turn to external financing sources when executing a take-private
acquisition. Given that a strategic bidder operates a preexisting busi-
ness, it should presumably be able to use its retained earnings to finance
all or part of the acquisition consideration. In many cases, however, a
company's existing cash on hand will simply be insufficient to fund an
acquisition of a publicly traded company. More importantly, even if a
company's cash were sufficient, using it in this fashion would often
10 Within this general structure, the operation of the private-equity industry creates a
further incentive for private-equity firms to minimize the amount of equity contributions made to
finance an LBO and to maximize the amount of debt financing. In particular, the success of a pri-
vate-equity firm in raising future investment funds from its outside investors will ordinarily turn on
the firm's ability to realize significant returns on its equity investments. See Robert P. Bartlett IM,
Venture Capital Agency Cost; and the False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L Rev 37,72-73
(2006) (arguing that market pressures and carried interest compensation structures encourage
venture capital investors to focus on achieving positive returns). Because financing an LBO with
considerable amounts of debt financing can greatly enhance a private-equity firm's return on in-
vestment, most private-equity firms will therefore seek to use the smallest equity contribution
possible when arranging acquisition financing. The end result is that most LBOs are financed with
considerable amounts of external debt financing. During the 1980s buyout boom, for instance, LBOs
used an average debt-to-firm value ratio of almost 90 percent for completed buyouts. See Steven N.
Kaplan and Jeremy C. Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s, 108
Q J Econ 313,325-26 (1993) (documenting the trend of increasing leverage for LBOs throughout the
1980s). Today, LBOs continue to seek funding primarily from debt financing, with LBOs completed
in 2006 averaging a debt-to-firm value ratio of approximately 60 percent. See M&A Stats 2 (Stan-
dard & Poor's Dec 2006), online at http://lcdcomps.com/utilslindex.pl?b=/toolsma.pl (visited Jan 11,
2009) (subscription required) ("S&P Leveraged Commentary").
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constitute poor financial management. In particular, acquiring a com-
pany with a bidder's cash on hand effectively capitalizes the target's
business with the bidder's equity, which is unlikely to be an optimal
form of capital structure for the target's business. As postulated by
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller in their seminal work on capital
structure, a company that uses debt financing to fund its operations
can lower its overall cost of capital given that interest payments on
debt are tax deductible." For similar reasons, a bidder that purchases a
company with cash will needlessly increase the target's cost of capital
where the target previously used some form of debt financing.'2
In light of the practical necessity of securing external financing
(particularly debt financing), any bidder considering a going-private
transaction must therefore confront the question of where to find it.
For many privately held bidders seeking to take private a publicly
traded company, the most obvious source of debt financing-traditional
bank loans-was effectively closed until the early 1980s. Like a tradi-
tional home mortgage, corporate bank loans were historically nego-
tiated as bilateral, individual credit agreements between a bank and a
borrower. Consequently, it was the rare bank that could afford to un-
derwrite and carry a loan large enough to support a take-private ac-
quisition given the tremendous amount of debt financing ordinarily
needed to effect the transaction.'3
Starting in the 1980s, however, commercial banks began to provide
loans to finance going-private acquisitions by syndicating a loan's funding
requirements among a large group of banks. Within the bank syndicate,
a single bank would generally act as the primary arranger in negotiat-
ing, drafting, and closing the loan transaction, with each syndicate
member holding a proportionate interest in the total loan (generally an
amortizing term loan or revolving credit facility)." By syndicating loans
in this fashion, banks could thus reduce some of the investment risk
associated with making non-investment-grade-or "leveraged" -loans
to fund leveraged acquisitions and, at the same time, could charge high-
11 See generally Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the
Cost of Capital:A Correction, 53 Am Econ Rev 433 (1963) (examining the tax advantages of debt
financing).
12 In fact, as suggested by W.G. Lewellen, where the cash flows of the acquiring and target
firms are less than perfectly correlated, the merger may actually provide an opportunity to in-
crease the total debt capacity of the combined firms, which should further encourage an acquir-
ing firm to fund the acquisition with some portion of debt. See Wilbur G. Lewellen, A Pure Fi-
nancial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J Fin 521,530-31 (1971).
13 See Allison A. Taylor and Ruth Yang, Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged
Loan Markets, in Allison Taylor and Alicia Sansone, eds, The Handbook of Loan Syndications
and Trading 21,23-24 (McGraw-Hill 2007).
14 See id.
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er interest rates for each loan given a borrower's overall credit risk." As
a result, since the mid-1980s, syndicated, senior-secured bank loans
have been a core source of acquisition finance for going-private trans-
actions, providing between 55 and 60 percent of the debt financing
needs for LBOs occurring between 1985 and 1990.16 Today, as in the
1980s, syndicated bank loans continue to dominate the financing struc-
tures of LBOs, with bank debt representing over 78 percent of all debt
financing used to fund LBOs during 2006."
Notwithstanding the availability of bank loans to fund LBOs,
bank debt will often be insufficient to cover all of the debt financing
needs of a going-private transaction, creating the need for an addi-
tional source of financing.18 It is the existence of this financing gap that
encourages bidders to consider issuing high-yield notes.
B. High-yield Notes and SOX
Like traditional bank loans, high-yield notes represent debt obli-
gations of a bidder, but unlike loans, they are structured as fixed- or
variable-rate promissory notes that are sold directly to institutional
investors. Moreover, to ensure that the issuance of high-yield notes
does not interfere with a bidder's ability to secure bank debt, the
notes must be subordinated in right of payment and security to the
primary syndicated loans. For this reason, successful marketing of
high-yield notes requires a number of economic incentives, most not-
ably a higher interest rate and the ability to resell the notes in the sec-
ondary trading market.9 To ensure the notes are freely tradable, how-
15 In general, loans made by banks to corporate borrowers can be divided into two classes:
investment-grade and leveraged loans. Investment-grade loans are loans considered to have a
low rate of default risk as reflected in the ratings assigned to the loan by one of the recognized
debt ratings agencies. Loans rated Baa3/BBB- or higher reflect a judgment by these agencies
that the borrower has adequate payment capacity to honor the loans and are therefore consi-
dered "investment grade." See Aswath Damodaran, Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice 122
(Wiley 2d ed 2001) (listing the ratings used by Standard & Poor's and Moody's). The lower de-
fault risk associated with investment-grade loans makes them easier to obtain from lenders, and
at lower interest rates. For a discussion of the manner in which ratings agencies rate loans and
bonds and the resulting interest-rate differentials between those rated investment grade and
non-investment grade, see id at 177-79.
16 See Kaplan and Stein, 108 Q J Econ at 330-31 (cited in note 10). See also Taylor and
Yang, Evolution at 23-24 (cited in note 13) (noting the growth of the syndicated loan market
since the 1980s).
17 See S&P Leveraged Commentary at 1 (cited in note 10).
18 Consider Jack S. Levin, Structuring Venture Capital, Private Equity, and Entrepreneurial
Transactions § 501.4 (Aspen 2006) (discussing the issues in structuring debt financing for
buyouts, including the relation between bank loans and subordinated debt).
19 High-yield notes are traded through a variety of means. The vast majority of bond trading
occurs in over-the-counter (OTC) markets whereby sales transactions are privately negotiated
among investors based on initial bid and asked quotations carried on the relevant trading system.
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ever, a private bidder issuing high-yield notes will generally take two
steps that have important consequences under SOX.
First, in connection with issuing the notes, the underwriter of a
high-yield debt offering will ordinarily require the bidder to enter into
a registration rights agreement committing the bidder to undertake
what is commonly called an "A/B Exchange Offer."' Because the is-
suance of notes constitutes the sale of securities, the issuance will be
subject to § 5 of the Securities Act of 193321 ("Securities Act"), thereby
requiring the bidder to file a formal registration statement with the
SEC or to rely on an appropriate exemption." To avoid the delay asso-
ciated with filing a registration statement, most bidders choose to rely
on an exemption such as those provided by Rule 144A3 (which exempts
sales made to qualified institutional buyers) and Regulation S2 (which
exempts sales made to non-US investors).7 In so doing, however, a
bidder significantly limits the marketability of the notes given that the
notes will thereafter be deemed "restricted securities" under the Securi-
ties Act and subject to a number of resale limitations."
The two most prominent systems are the Private Offers, Resales and Trading through Automated
Linkages (PORTAL) system maintained by the National Association of Securities Dealers and the
privately published National Daily Quotation Service (NDQS) "Yellow Sheet&" PORTAL lists
price quotations for notes that were issued pursuant to Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933 and
is therefore limited to investors eligible under SEC Rule 144A. The Yellow Sheets cover a broad
array of corporate bonds and are distributed to subscribing broker-dealers with information regard-
ing the names and telephone numbers of persons expressing an interest in making a market in
particular bonds, and often the bid or asked price at which the market maker is willing to buy or sell
the security. In addition to these OTC markets, corporate bonds are sometimes listed and traded on
national securities exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange. For an overview of bond
trading markets, see Gary B. Wilcox and David M. Rievman, Restructuring Troubled Debt under the
New Debt Exchange Rules, 10 Va Tax Rev 665,688-97 (1991).
20 See William J. Whelan III, The Statutory Arrangement for Public and Private Securities
Offerings under the Securities Act of 1933, 1617 PLI/Corp 109, 118 (2007). These exchange offers
are also referred to as "Exxon Capital" exchange offers after the seminal SEC interpretive letter
that authorized this practice. See Exxon Capital Holding Corp, 1988 SEC No-Act LEXIS 682.
21 Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-22, 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC § 77a
et seq.
22 See 15 USC § 77e (prohibiting sale or offer of any "security" unless a registration state-
ment is in effect as to the security).
23 17 CFR § 230.144A.
24 17 CFR §§ 230.901-230.905.
25 See Philip T. Ruegger III, Richard A. Fenyes, and Igor Fert, Trends in Financing and Exit
Structures, 1517 PLI/Corp 179, 182-83 (2005) ("High yield offerings that finance LBOs are typi-
cally done as private placements that rely on exemptions from registration under the Securities
Act by selling to qualified institutional buyers pursuant to Rule 144A and to investors outside
the United States pursuant to Regulation S.").
26 In general, the resale restrictions that attach to restricted securities are designed to ensure
that a purchaser of unregistered notes is not herself required to register the notes under § 5 of the
Securities Act (which prohibits any sale of unregistered securities) upon reselling them. Notwith-
standing § 5's broad scope, § 4(1) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from registration for
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." 15 USC § 77d(1). While a
seller of restricted securities could seek to rely on this language by itself as a basis for an exemption
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An A/B Exchange Offer permits holders of high-yield notes to
avoid these resale limitations. In the offer-which a bidder usually agrees
to complete within 180 days of the initial sale of unregistered notes-
investors exchange their unregistered high-yield notes for substantial-
ly identical notes that are registered with the SECY By exchanging
their unregistered notes for registered notes, investors thus cleanse the
high-yield notes of their restricted status, thereby significantly enhanc-
ing their marketability in the secondary trading market."
By filing a registration statement covering the replacement notes
in the A/B Exchange Offer, however, a bidder becomes an "issuer"
under SOX. Specifically, § 2 of SOX defines "issuer" broadly to in-
clude any company
from registration (often referred to as a "41h transaction"), most holders of restricted securities seek
to resell restricted securities in compliance with either Rule 144 or Rule 144A, which provide two
safe harbors by which holders can resell restricted securities without the need for registering the
securities with the SEC. Each rule, however, imposes various resale restrictions that effectively limit
the marketability of restricted securities. For instance, Rule 144 imposes (among other things) a
minimum holding period before restricted securities can be sold, along with limitations on the
volume of securities that can be sold at any one time. See 17 CFR § 230.144. Rule 144A provides
fewer resale limitations but requires that any sale of restricted securities be made to a qualified
institutional buyer (in general, institutional investors that own and invest on a discretionary basis
at least $100 million in securities of nonaffiliates). See 17 CFR § 230.144A.
27 See Ruegger, 1517 PLI/Corp at 182 (cited in note 25) ("In U.S. LBOs, companies agree
to exchange the privately placed bonds for identical bonds pursuant to a registered transaction
with the SEC."). A company's failure to complete the A/B Exchange Offer within this time
period will generally result in periodic increases of the interest rate payable on the notes until
the exchange offer is completed. See id ("If the company fails to register exchange notes and con-
summate an exchange offer within a specified period of time ... (usually around 180 days), the
interest rate on the bonds increases ... up to a specified cap (usually 1% per annum).").
28 It should be emphasized that the issuance of "restricted" securities need not impair the
functioning of an active secondary trading market. As discussed in note 19, high-yield notes are
generally traded in markets limited to institutional investors, more specifically, to those meeting
the definition of a "qualified institutional buyer" under Rule 144A. Accordingly, Rule 144A
would permit active secondary trading of high-yield notes in these markets without the need for
registration so long as issuers provide note holders with the financial information set forth in
Rule 144A(d)(4)(i). See 17 CFR § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (requiring that the issuer disclose the na-
ture of its business, its most recent balance sheet, and other similar financial statements for the
two prior years). The need for registration is entirely a product of investor demand. Email from
Joel Greenberg, Co-chair of Corporate and Finance Department, Kaye Scholer LLP, to Robert P.
Bartlett III (Oct 25, 2007) (noting that many institutional investors are required to hold only
registered securities). In addition to an A/B Exchange Offer, registration of notes is also possible
by committing the issuer to file a resale registration statement covering the investors' initial
resale of the notes. Using a resale registration, however, will obligate the investors to comply
with the prospectus delivery requirements under the Securities Act and will also require the
issuer to identify the investors in the registration statement as selling noteholders, which poten-
tially exposes investors to liability under the Securities Act. Under the SEC's Exxon Capital No-
action Letter, investors in an A/B Exchange Offer need not comply with the prospectus delivery
requirement nor be identified in the registration statement. See Exxon Capital, 1988 SEC No-
Act LEXIS 682 at *2-3. As such, a resale registration statement is usually limited to instances
where an A/B Exchange Offer is not permitted under Exxon-Capital (for example, the issuance
of convertible notes).
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the securities of which are registered under [§ 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19347 ("Exchange Act")] or that is required to
file reports under [§ 15(d) of the Exchange Act], or that files or
has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effec-
tive under the Securities Act of 1933.3
Under § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, a company is required to file re-
ports with the SEC commencing on the date that the SEC declares
effective a registration statement under the Securities Act covering
any type of security, including high-yield notes.1 Moreover, under the
last clause of the definition of "issuer" in § 2 of SOX, a company that
merely files a registration statement with the SEC becomes a SOX is-
suer regardless of whether the SEC declares effective the registration
statement.32 As a result, once a private bidder files a registration state-
ment covering the A/B Exchange Offer, it becomes subject to most of
the substantive provisions of SOX for however long it is required to file
Exchange Act reports.
To be sure, the obligation to file Exchange Act reports will often
be short-lived. Under § 15(d), a bidder's duty to file reports following
an A/B Exchange Offer will be automatically suspended for any fiscal
year (other than the fiscal year during which the bidder's registration
statement became effective) if the securities covered by the registra-
tion statement are held of record by fewer than three hundred record-
holders and the bidder is not otherwise required to file reports under
the Exchange Act.33 And because high-yield notes-like most publicly
traded securities-are held indirectly through securities intermediaries,
it is the rare high-yield issuer that has more than three hundred record-
holders of its notes.-" Under § 15(d), most privately owned bidders will
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-291,48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15
USC § 78a et seq.
30 15 USC § 7201(7).
31 15 USC § 78o(d).
32 15 USC § 7201(7).
33 15 USC § 78o(d).
34 See Mark B. Tresnowski and Gerald T. Nowak, The High-yield Offering: An Issuer's Pers-
pective 53 (Merrill 2004) (noting that most high-yield issuers have less than three hundred holders
of record because the notes are "held in book-entry rather than certified form"). In general,
holding securities in indirect form is the predominant means by which investors settle and clear
securities transactions in liquid secondary securities markets. In an indirect system, the beneficial
owners are not recorded on the books of the issuer as holders of the securities. Rather, the direct
holder is a clearing corporation or other intermediary, such as the Depository Trust Company
(DTC) in the United States or Euroclear in Belgium. These intermediaries hold the securities for
the benefit of their participants, which are the hundreds (sometimes thousands) of broker-
dealers and banks who are themselves interested in trading securities on the secondary market
or who have customers who are interested in such trading. Trades by investors in securities are
then consummated by entries on the books of these intermediaries without any need for any
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therefore be entitled to cease filing periodic reports with the SEC at the
end of the fiscal year in which they complete an A/B Exchange Offer.M
It is at this point, however, that private bidders will have to take
the second action that has important SOX consequences: issuers of
high-yield notes must generally agree to issue the notes pursuant to an
indenture containing an express obligation to file periodic reports
with the SEC even after the issuer is no longer required to do so un-
der § 15(d) of the Exchange Act.6 Although a company in this situa-
tion will be only a "voluntary filer" for purposes of the Exchange Act,
the bidder will remain subject to most (although not all) of the re-
quirements of SOX. The reason stems from the fact that most of
SOX's requirements (such as the internal controls provision of § 404)
have been formally incorporated into the Exchange Act's periodic
reporting requirements.
Table 1 provides a summary of the key provisions of SOX that
apply to private bidders issuing high-yield notes, whether by virtue of
being an "issuer" under SOX or a "voluntary filer" under the Ex-
change Act. Not surprisingly, the messy patchwork of regulations that
applies to high-yield issuers has been a constant source of consterna-
tion for companies and their attorneys since SOX first took effect."
entry on the records maintained by the issuer. See James S. Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Re-
vised UC.C. Article 8,43 UCLA L Rev 1431,1443-45 (1996).
35 See Tresnowksi and Nowak, High-yield Offering at 53 (cited in note 34).
36 See id. See also Committee on Trust Indentures and Indenture Trustees, ABA Section of
Business Law, Model Negotiated Covenants and Related Definitions, 61 Bus Law 1439, 1535
(2006) ("It is now almost universally true in high-yield indentures that the Company is required
to make regular SEC reports to ensure the steady flow of readily accessible information for
current holders and prospective holders.").
37 See, for example, Joshua L. Targoff, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Surprising Impact on Private
Equity, 3 Private Equity Rep 1 (Debevoise & Plimpton 2002), online at http://www.debevoise.com
/files/Publication/5918db6e-5bff-4fa-bb38-Oea3ba2l56c/Presentation/PublicationAttachmentl/6f7
91fb-1481-47a7-bfd7-c4d71edeb774/Fal12002.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) ("This on-again, off-again
status is one of many examples in the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act where the treatment of voluntary
filers is not altogether clear.").
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TABLE 1
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF SOX
APPLICABLE TO HIGH-YIELD ISSUERS
Applies to All Applies only to
"Issuers" and to All "Issuers" but Not to
Operative Provision: Voluntary Filers Voluntary Filers
Management assessment of internal controls (§ 404) X
Principal executive officer and financial officer
civil certification (§ 302)
Principal executive officer and financial officer
criminal certification (§ 906)
Prohibition on extending personal loans
to executives (§ 402)
Forfeiture of bonuses and profits if company
issues an accounting restatement as a result X
of misconduct (§ 304)
Conditions for use of non-GAAP financial
measures (§ 401) X
Audit committee financial expert disclosure (§ 407) X
Code of ethics disclosure (§ 406) X
Disclosure in MD&A of off-balance-sheet arrange- X
ments and aggregate contractual obligations (§ 401)
Restriction on providing non-audit services and
requirement of pre-approval of auditing and non- X
auditing services (§§ 201,202, and 204)*
Auditor conflicts of interest (§§ 203 and 206) X
Prohibition on improperly influencing the conduct
of audits (§ 303)
Rapid and current "plain English" disclosure of
material changes (§ 409)
*Although auditor independence rules do not technically apply prior to the filing of a registration statement,
they do apply to the auditors; therefore, as a practical matter, these rules apply even prior to filing the registra-
tion statement.
II. THE AVAILABILITY OF SOX-FREE DEBT FINANCING
Given that a high-yield issuance will ordinarily be the sole reason a
private bidder will be subject to SOX, one might reasonably wonder
whether privately held bidders might actively seek to avoid high-yield
debt just to avoid the costs involved in complying with the legislation.
This hypothesis would seem especially appropriate in the post-SOX
credit environment where a quiet revolution in syndicated bank lending
has dramatically increased the availability of "SOX-free" debt financing.
As noted above, a core source of acquisition financing for going-
private transactions has long been the syndicated loans traditionally
funded by a syndicate of commercial banks. Beginning in the 1990s,
Going Private but Staying Public
however, a variety of factors resulted in a significant drop-off in the
willingness of commercial banks to fund private, leveraged loans at the
same time that a new group of institutional investors emerged as major
purchasers of syndicated loan interests.38 As Figure 2 illustrates, the ab-
rupt transformation of the leveraged lending market from one in which
traditional, commercial banks were the primary lenders to one in which
these nonbank, institutional investors have become the primary source
of lending capital has been nothing short of extraordinary.
FIGURE 2
GROWTH OF NONBANKS IN
PRIMARY LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET
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Comprised of high-yield mutual funds, insurance companies, hedge
funds, and collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), institutional investors
radically redefined the leveraged-loan market during the late 1990s. As
documented by Allison Taylor and Ruth Yang, the emergence of these
investors facilitated the development of the syndicated-loan market
into a mature asset class that only enhanced the attractiveness of syndi-
cated loans as an investment option.9 A clear indicator of the rapid ma-
turation of the market was the exponential growth of the secondary trad-
38 See Taylor and Yang, Evolution at 24-25 (cited in note 13). In 1989, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion provided guidelines regarding highly leveraged transactions that resulted in banks limiting
their holdings of leveraged loans. See Glenn Yago and Donald McCarthy, The US Leveraged Loan
Market:A Primer 16 (Milken Institute Oct 2004), online at http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications
publications.taf?function=detail&ID=380&cat=ResRep (visited Jan 11, 2009) (detailing the
history of the syndicated loan market). At the same time, banks also began utilizing portfolio man-
agement techniques and profitability models that biased banks against holding leveraged loans.
See Steven Miller, New World Order, Daily Deal (Sept 20,2002).
39 See Taylor and Yang, Evolution at 25-26 (cited in note 13).
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ing market in loan interests. Whereas a total of $8 billion of syndicated
loans traded in the secondary market during 1991, the annual trading
volume of these loans increased to $238 billion by 2006.'0 Significantly,
the vast majority of these trades - over 80 percent by value - involved
leveraged loans." As a consequence, during the 1990s the leveraged-
loan market began to attract investors not only because of the yields on
the underlying loans but also because of the opportunity to capitalize
on price movements and temporary market inefficiencies. 2
The ultimate result of this transformation was a meteoric rise in
the demand for leveraged loans. In each of 2004, 2005, and 2006, US
leveraged-loan issuances set new records at $265 billion, $295 billion,
and upwards of $466 billion, respectively. 3 For both privately and pub-
licly held companies, the widespread availability of leveraged loans
encouraged borrowers that had traditionally used high-yield debt to
look increasingly to leveraged loans. As Figure 3 illustrates, by the end
of 2006, overall leveraged-loan issuances were four times as large as
high-yield bond issuances. Within individual firms, a 2007 study by Fitch
Ratings found that the annual growth rate of leveraged loans in bor-
40 Reuters Loan Pricing Corp, U.S. Secondary Loan Market Volume, online at http://www.
loanpricing.com/analytics/pricing-service-volumel.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009).
41 See Yago and McCarthy, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market at 25 (cited in note 38).
42 See id at 26.
43 See Steven C. Miller and Robert Polenberg, Leveraged Loans: Record-setting Leveraged Loan
Market Shows No Signs of Slowing (Yet) (Standard & Poor's Jan 3, 2007), online at http://www2.
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1148406249020.html (visited Jan 11,
2009) (reporting US issuances for the first eleven months of 2006); Steven C. Miller, The U.S.
Leveraged Loan Market: Huge Deals, Few Bargains (Standard & Poor's Apr 24, 2006), online at
http://www2.standardandpoorscomportal/site/sp/en/uspage.article/2,1,1,0,1145997542521.html (vi-
sited Jan 11, 2009) (reporting US issuances for 2004 and 2005). Much of this growth in demand
stemmed from the rapid emergence of CLOs as the dominant institutional investor in the market. See
William May, Mariarosa Verde, and Eric Rosenthal, CLOs More Concentrated in Shareholder-
friendly and Covenant Light Loans 1 (Fitch Ratings Dec 21,2006), online at http://www.fitchratings.
com/corporate/reports/report-frame.cfm?rptjid=306304 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (subscription
required) (noting that one of the largest sources of increased demand for leveraged loans has
been CLOs). A relatively recent financial innovation, CLOs are special-purpose investment funds
structured to invest in a portfolio of syndicated loans. Since their debut in the early 1990s, their
growth as a popular investment instrument has been remarkable. The amount of outstanding CLOs
grew from less than $1 billion in 1994 to nearly $260 billion in 2004, while their share of the leve-
raged loan market increased from less than 5 percent to over 60 percent during the same time
period. See Yago and McCarthy, The Leveraged Loan Market at 22, figure 13 (cited in note 38)
(showing growth of CLOS from 1994 to 2002); Miller, The U.S. Leveraged Loan Market (reporting
the 2004 value of $260 million); Barry Bobrow, et al, An Introduction to the Primary Market, in
Taylor and Sansone, eds, Handbook 155,165-67 (cited in note 13) (discussing the growth in the share
of the leveraged loan market attributed to CLOs). Between 2003 and 2006, more than $200 billion of
CLOs were issued, with $105 billion being issued in 2006 alone. See Robert Horton, et al, High Yield
and Leveraged Loan Market Review: Fourth Quarter and 2006 4 (Fitch Ratings Feb 5,2007), online at
httpJ/www.fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/reportframe.cfn?rpt id=312888 (visited Jan 11, 2009)
(subscription required).
[76:7
Going Private but Staying Public
rowers' capital structures was 28 percent-more than three times the
9 percent growth rate of high-yield notes."
FIGURE 3
US LEVERAGED LOAN AND HIGH-YIELD BOND ISSUANCE
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In many cases, the role of high-yield notes was taken by a particu-
lar type of subordinated leveraged loan, the "second-lien" loan.45 Also
known as junior secured or Tranche B loans, second-lien loans resem-
ble ordinary, syndicated bank loans, but they are subordinated in right
of payment and security to the primary "first-lien" bank loans. Al-
though rarely used during the 1990s, second-lien loans became an in-
creasingly important source of subordinated debt after 2003. By 2006,
second-lien issues represented 8 percent of total institutional loan vo-
lume, commonly crowding out the need for high-yield debt.6 Table 2,
for instance, summarizes the final financing structure for the $18 bil-
lion LBO of Georgia-Pacific Corp by privately owned Koch Indus-
tries.47 Notwithstanding the considerable size of the transaction, Koch
44 See William May, Mariarosa Verde, and Eric Rosenthal, Speculative Grade Balance Sheets
Becoming More Loan-heavy-Recovery Prospects at Risk 1 (Fitch Ratings May 7, 2007), online
at http://www.fitchratings.comlcorporate/reports/reporLframecfm?rpt_id=324954 (visited Jan 11,
2009) (subscription required) (examining the capital structures of ninety US firms that had at
least $500 million in outstanding high-yield bonds in 2005 and that tapped the leveraged loan
market in 2006).
45 See Horton, et al, High Yield and Leveraged Loan Market Review at 3 (cited in note 43).
46 See id at 4.
47 See Koch Forest Products, Inc, Offer to Purchase Georgia-Pacific Corporation Common Stock
32 (Nov 17,2005), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/41077/000119312505228536/dex99
ala.htm (visited Jan 11, 2009) ("Georgia-Pacific Offering Circular").
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Industries was able to finance its bid entirely with an equity contribu-
tion combined with several leveraged loans.-
TABLE 2
GEORGIA-PACIFIC FINANCING
Source of Funds Amount
Equity Contribution from Koch Industries $7.1 billion
Senior Secured Term Loan ("Tender Facility")* $6.4 billion
The Merger Facility:
First-lien Senior Secured Credit Facility $8.5 billion
Second-lien Senior Secured Credit Facility $2.5 billion
*To be repaid with proceeds from the Merger Facility.
Source: Georgia-Pacific Offering Circular at 32-36 (cited in note 47).
Significantly, by turning to leveraged loans in lieu of high-yield
debt, a privately held issuer could also avoid subjecting itself to SOX.
Participants in the leveraged-loan industry have long maintained that
an issuer of loans has no need to conduct a registered offering of loan
obligations given that by issuing "loans" rather than "notes" an issuer
has not issued any securities within the meaning of federal or state se-
curities laws.9 As a result, an issuer of loans has no need to file a regis-
tration statement covering the loan interests, thereby allowing the issuer
to avoid becoming an "issuer" under § 2 of SOX. For similar reasons, by
concluding that loan interests are not securities, participants in the loan
industry have maintained that federal and state securities laws do not
apply to the subsequent trading of leveraged loans, thus making it un-
necessary for a borrower to file periodic reports with the SEC in order
to ensure loan interests are freely tradable.' In short, by maintaining
that loan interests are not securities, the leveraged-loan industry has
developed a well-established history of issuing and trading leveraged
loans without any attempt to subject borrowers to the regulatory bur-
dens associated with the issuance and trading of high-yield notes.
For privately held bidders, then, the notion that after 2002 a going-
private transaction might be financed using entirely private, SOX-free
debt was hardly idle speculation. If privately held bidders really wanted
to avoid the hassle of complying with SOX after a high-yield issuance,
SOX-free financing alternatives were available, as illustrated by the
48 Id at 32-36.
49 See, for example, Tiziana M. Bason, et al, Effects of the Legal Characterization of Loans
under the Securities Laws, in Taylor and Sansone, eds, Handbook 85, 87 (cited in note 13) (noting
how the conclusion that loan interests are not securities "remains fundamental to the market's
development and operation").
50 See id.
[76:7
2009] Going Private but Staying Public 25
buyout of Georgia-Pacific. As summarized by the head of corporate
finance at Latham & Watkins LLP, "People are annoyed, to say the
least, by SOX. And so the alternatives-to do a mezzanine financing
or a second-lien deal-are more attractive than they used to be. That's
because these alternative forms of junior capital don't drag the whole
Sarbanes-Oxley program with them."51
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
A. Methodology and Data Description
To better understand whether the regulatory costs of SOX con-
tributed to the rise in going-private transactions following its enact-
ment, I analyzed the financing decisions for all going-private transac-
tions that occurred during the four years prior to the year of SOX's
enactment (1998-2001) and the four years after it (2003-2006) and
that involved nonfinancial US target firms that had publicly traded
equity securities on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the
American Stock Exchange (ASE), or the Nasdaq Stock Market. The
year 2002 was excluded given the difficulty of discerning whether
transactions that closed in the first half of that year might have been
influenced by the anticipation of the new statute, which was formally
enacted in July 2002. By excluding 2002, the sample thus permits a
clean comparison of those transactions that were structured before
the market was aware of the costs of SOX and those transactions that
were structured after such awareness was widespread.
To assemble the sample, I first compiled a listing of all firms that
had any equity securities delisted from the three exchanges as record-
ed in the historical delisting data maintained by the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP). Because CRSP maintains compre-
hensive price and trading information for all securities listed on these
three exchanges, this approach had the benefit of providing a compre-
hensive list of all firms trading on the three major US stock exchanges
that might have gone private. This methodology also avoided the pitfalls
of other studies of going-private transactions, which have tended to rely
on Schedule 13e-3 filings, Form 15 filings, or the database of acquisi-
tions maintained by Thomson Financial Securities Data Company." For
51 Carolyn Sargent, Could SOX Hurt Junk Issuance?, Investment Dealers' Dig 7 (Jan 31,
2005) (interviewing Kirk Davenport about compliance with SOX).
52 Ste note 9.
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a variety of reasons, these methods tend to either overstate or unders-S 53
tate the number of going-private transactions.
For each security that was recorded in CRSP as having been de-
listed, data was then hand collected from the issuer's Exchange Act fil-
ings on the SEC's EDGAR system to confirm whether the delisting
represented an acquisition of the issuer's publicly traded stock by
another firm. After excluding equity recapitalizations not involving a
change in control and acquisitions by foreign companies, this process
yielded a total of 2,269 acquisitions. The SEC filings for each target cor-
poration were then further examined to determine whether the stock of
the acquiring firm was publicly traded or privately held. Overall, 468
of the 2,269 acquisitions were initiated by privately held bidders.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the full acquisition sample.
53 In particular, studies relying entirely on Schedule 13e-3 filings-see, for example, Engel,
Hayes, and Wang, 44 J Acct & Econ at 117-18 (cited in note 9) (using a sample of firms making
Form 13e-3 filings to examine the effect of SOX on firms' going-private decisions); Carney, 55 Emory
L J at 149 (cited in note 4) (same)-understate the number of going-private transactions given that
a Schedule 13e-3 need not be filed for a take-private transaction initiated by a bidder that is not
affiliated with the target or the target's management. See 17 CFR § 240.13e-3(a). As such, these
studies omit take-private acquisitions by an unrelated private company as well as many conven-
tional LBOs sponsored by private-equity firms. On the other hand, studies that use those firms
that filed a Form 15 covering their equity securities-that is, the primary form notifying the SEC
that a class of securities is held by fewer than three hundred persons-will often be overinclu-
sive. See, for example, Block, 14 J Applied Fm at 41-42 (cited in note 9). In this case, the sample
will include many firms that continue to have their equity publicly traded on the OTC market or
that may still have other securities (in particular debt securities) that require the company to file
periodic reports with the SEC. Likewise, studies that have used Thomson's Securities Data Com-
pany Platinum database (SDC) of acquisitions to identify going-private transactions will also be
overinclusive. See, for example, Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley, Going-private Decisions at 13
(cited in note 9). By relying on SDC's coding scheme in which bidders are classified as "public"
or "private," these studies assume that all "private" bidders-as well as the surviving firm-are
immune to the SEC periodic reporting requirements. For the reasons discussed in Part I, private
bidders will often remain subject to the Exchange Act by virtue of having issued high-yield debt
either prior to the acquisition or in connection with the acquisition.
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TABLE 3
ACQUISITIONS OF FIRMS TRADING
ON THE NYSE, NASDAQ, AND ASE,
1998-2001 AND 2003-2006
This Table reports summary statistics on size and deal characteristics for the sample
of 2,269 acquisitions of publicly traded companies trading on the NYSE, the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and ASE. Data are reported for the full sample and by the type of win-
ning bidder. "Publicly Traded Bidder" is a US bidder having publicly traded equity
securities at the time of the acquisition. "Privately Owned Bidder" is a US bidder that is
privately held at the time of the acquisition. "Market Value of Target Equity" is the
average value of target's equity (stock price x shares outstanding) over the thirty days
prior to the acquisition's closing date.
Market
Market Value Value Percent Percent
of Target of Target Equity Equity
Market Value Equity Equity Acquired Acquired
Total Publicly Privately Percent Percent of Target Acquired Acquired by by
Acquisi- Traded Owned Public Private Equity by Public by Private Public Private
Year tions Bidders Bidders Bidders Bidders Acquired Bidders Bidders Bidders Bidders
1998 398 336 62 84.4 15.6 $372,181,314 $359,620,151 $12,561,162 96.6 3.4
1999 447 378 69 84.6 15.4 $637,673,759 $626,900,576 $10,773,183 98.3 1.7
2000 450 372 78 82.7 17.3 $824,533,417 $809,241,546 $15,291,871 98.1 1.9
2001 314 262 52 83.4 16.6 $373,726,807 $364,140,461 $9,586,347 97.4 2.6
Subtotal 1609 1348 261 83.8 16.2 $2,208,115,297 $2,159,902,734 $48,212,563 97.8 2.2
2003 163 106 57 65.0 35.0 $119,947,279 $111,836,992 $8,110,287 93.2 6.8
2004 149 102 47 68.5 31.5 $134,275,805 $95,355,247 $38,920,558 71.0 29.0
2005 152 115 37 75.7 24.3 $340,110,634 $289,188,815 $50,921,819 85.0 15.0
2006 196 130 66 66.3 33.7 $368,195,411 $286,851,337 $81,344,074 77.9 22.1
Subtotal 660 453 207 68.6 31.4 $962,529,130 $783,232,392 $179,296,737 81.4 18.6
Total 2269 1801 468 79.4 20.6 $3,170,644,426 $2,943,135,126 $227,509,301 92.8 7.2
In general, the figures in Table 3 differ only modestly from other
studies of going-private transactions. Figure 4, for instance, compares
the annual rates of going-private transactions in Table 3 with the data
on going-private transactions used by the Committee on Capital Mar-
kets Regulation. 4 As Figure 4 illustrates, acquisitions of NYSE-, Nas-
54 See Capital Markets Report at 34-35 (cited in note 3). The Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation obtained its data on the annual rates of going-private transactions from Mergerstat
Review. See id at 35. Because of the publication date of the Capital Markets Report, Mergerstat
had yet to publish the data on the incidence of going-private transactions beyond 2004. To permit
comparison with the data presented in this Article, I therefore supplemented the data provided
in the Capital Markets Report by obtaining directly from Mergerstat the incidence of going-
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daq-, and ASE-traded companies clearly conformed to the general rise
in going-private transactions after the enactment of SOX in 2002. In
fact, the data for the NYSE, Nasdaq, and ASE firms suggest even a
greater rise in going-private transactions after SOX, with private bid-
ders accounting for an average of 31 percent of all acquisitions be-
tween 2003 and 2006. Figure 5 shows that when the data are analyzed
in terms of the market value of equity that was delisted in connection
with each acquisition, the trend is equally striking. Clearly, privately
held bidders had a greater relative presence in the public takeover
market in the four years following SOX in terms of both transaction
volume and the market value of equity acquired.
FIGURE 4
GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL
ACQUISITIONS, MAIN SAMPLE VERSUS FINDINGS OF
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION
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private transactions for 2005 and 2006. See 39 Mergerstat Review 42 (Mergerstat 2008) (listing
the going-private transactions as a percentage of all public takeovers for years 1998-2007).
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FIGURE 5
GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF
ALL ACQUISITIONS BY TRANSACTION VALUE
1998-2001 AND 2003-2006
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These aggregate figures ignore, however, the extent to which tar-
get firms acquired by private bidders might still be subject to SOX. As
shown in Table 4, approximately 28 percent (n - 130) of the listed com-
panies that went private in the sample remained Exchange Act report-
ing companies or became Exchange Act reporting companies within
twelve months of the transaction. Table 4 provides a breakdown of the
primary reasons why these "private firms" remained public reporting
companies. As the table reveals, the vast majority of these companies
(75 percent) remained Exchange Act filers due to either the bidder's
use of high-yield acquisition financing followed by an A/B Exchange
Offer (an "A/B Exchange Transaction") or the assumption of a tar-
get's preexisting high-yield debt. An additional 12 percent remained
reporting companies because the private bidder had its own preexist-
ing high-yield debt or because the surviving firm would complete a
high-yield debt offering within twelve months of the transaction. Thir-
teen percent of the companies remained reporting companies due to
the listing of the bidder's equity securities in connection with the acqui-
sition or because the surviving firm conducted an offering of equity
securities to the public within twelve months of the acquisition.
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TABLE 4
GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS THAT RESULTED
IN AN EXCHANGE ACT REPORTING COMPANY
This Table reports summary statistics regarding the reasons why 130 of the 468 going-
private transactions resulted in surviving firms with continuing SEC reporting obliga-
tions. Observations were limited to those firms that became an SEC reporting company
within twelve months of the closing date of the going-private transaction.
Percent of Going-
private Transactions
Resulting in an Ex-
change Act Reporting
Company Reason for Remaining an Exchange Act Reporting Company
Surviving
High-yield Target Has Firm
Percent Acquisition Reporting Bidder Has Subsequent Surviving Firm Continued
of Financing Obligations Outstanding Subsequent Listing of Listed Equity to File Due
Going- Followed under High-yield High-yield Equity Securities to Over-the-
private by A/B Preexisting Notes at Issuance by Securities in Connection counter
Trans- Exchange High-yield Time of Surviving by Surviving with Trading of
Year Total actions Offer Notes Acquisition Firm Company Acquisition Common Stock
1998 29 47 19 4 4 2 0 0 0
1999 22 32 12 4 2 0 0 4 0
2000 17 22 5 3 2 0 3 3 1
2001 11 21 5 2 0 1 2 1 0
Subtotal: 79 30 41 13 8 3 5 8 1
2003 10 18 6 1 1 1 0 1 0
2004 12 26 10 0 0 1 0 1 0
2005 10 27 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
2006 19 29 15 1 1 0 0 2 0
Subtotal: 51 25 40 3 2 2 0 4 0
Total: 130 28 81 16 10 5 5 12 1
Overall, these data suggest that prior studies and reports regard-
ing the rise in going-private transactions after SOX may have dramat-
ically overstated the extent to which SOX drove firms to go private
following its enactment. Certainly, the data confirm that going-private
transactions accounted for a greater proportion of all public company
acquisitions in the period 2003-2006, but the data also make clear that
a large proportion of these going-private transactions resulted in firms
that remained Exchange Act reporting companies and, consequently,
subject to SOX after 2002. Specifically, in each year of the study, any-
where from 18 to 47 percent of going-private transactions represented
transactions in which the surviving firms remained Exchange Act re-
porting companies. Based on this fact alone, one might reasonably
question the reliability of studies that purport to draw conclusions
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about the effect of SOX by looking simply at the relative number of
going-private transactions since its enactment.
Moreover, using the proportion of going-private transactions to
analyze the effect of SOX is further complicated by the considerable
falloff after 2002 in public-bidder activity in general. Whereas an aver-
age of 337 public bidders completed acquisitions each year during the
period 1998-2001, the annual average fell to only 113 during the period
2003-2006. A t-test indicates that this difference in averages is statistically
significant at the 1 percent confidence level (p = 0.0002, two-tailed). In
contrast, the annual average of going-private transactions fell modestly
and insignificantly between the periods 1998-2001 and 2003-2006, from
65 to 52 (p = 0.156, two-tailed). Consequently, the increased proportion
of going-private transactions after 2002 was driven not by any absolute
increase in private-bidder activity but by a dramatic falloff in public-
bidder activity. To be sure, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis
that SOX created a competitive disadvantage for public bidders, but it is
also consistent with explanations having little to do with SOX. For in-
stance, to the extent that the bull stock market of the late 1990s might
have encouraged public bidders to pursue stock-for-stock transactions,
the collapse of the stock market after 2001 might have simply restored
the normal equilibrium between public bidders and private bidders.
C. SOX and the Use of High-yield Debt Financing
To avoid these analytical difficulties, a more manageable examina-
tion of the hypothesis that SOX has encouraged companies to go pri-
vate is to focus on the rate at which public targets remained Exchange
Act reporting companies after an acquisition by a private bidder. If
the costs of SOX truly encouraged companies to go private, then one
should observe after 2002 a general decline in the rate at which pub-
licly traded targets elected to remain Exchange Act reporting compa-
nies after their acquisition. As noted previously, this would seem espe-
cially true given the ready availability of SOX-free forms of acquisi-
tion finance during the period 2003-2006.
As shown in Figure 6, however, the overall data do not support
this hypothesis. On the contrary, the rate at which public targets re-
mained Exchange Act reporting companies following a going-private
transaction consistently increased between 2003 and 2006. Isolating
those transactions that were financed through an A/B Exchange
Transaction indicates a similar trend. As Figure 6 reveals, in contrast
to the Georgia-Pacific buyout discussed above, the buyout wave that
occurred during 2003-2006 continued to use high-yield debt as a prin-
cipal component of acquisition financing.
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FIGURE 6
FREQUENCY OF GOING-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS THAT RESULTED
IN EXCHANGE ACT REPORTING COMPANIES
1998-2001 AND 2003-2006
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Moreover, comparing the period 1998-2001 against the period
2003-2006 reveals no significant difference in the proportion of public
targets that remained Exchange Act reporting companies following a
going-private transaction. Overall, approximately 30 percent of the
going-private transactions that occurred from 1998 to 2001 resulted in
surviving firms that remained subject to the Exchange Act reporting
requirements, compared to 25 percent during the 2003-2006 period.
Figure 6 reveals that the only major drop in the proportion of public
targets that remained Exchange Act reporting companies following a
going-private transaction occurred several years prior to SOX in
1998-1999. This considerable falloff is worth noting, as it stemmed from
the fact that the late 1990s witnessed a booming high-yield debt mar-
ket." In each of 1997 and 1998, for instance, high-yield debt issuances
set record highs on account of extremely favorable credit conditions.
The market came to an abrupt halt in the autumn of 1998, however,
following Russia's debt default and the near collapse of the highly
leveraged hedge fund Long-term Capital Management (LTCM).16 Our
55 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr, The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U Ill L Rev 215, 326 ("The vo-
lume of newly issued junk bonds in the United States rose from about $40 billion in 1992 to more
than $260 billion in 1997-98, before declining to less than $150 billion in 1999-2000.").
56 These two events triggered a global "flight to quality" as investors reallocated investment
portfolios away from illiquid, high-risk debt securities towards "safer," highly liquid securities
such as US Treasuries. See id at 347-48. As a result, yield spreads between investment- and non-
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sample of pre-SOX transactions therefore reflects the tail end of the
1990s boom in high-yield debt issuances.
Yet even including 1998 data, a Pearson chi-square test of the pro-
portion of going-private transactions that resulted in Exchange Act re-
porting companies during 1998-2001 compared to 2003-2006 reveals
little evidence of a statistically significant difference (chi-square = 1.82,
df = 1, p = 0.177). There is even less evidence of a significant difference
between the two periods when comparing the proportion of going-
private transactions that utilized an A/B Exchange Transaction (chi-
square = 1.05, df = 1,p = 0.305). In aggregate, these figures suggest SOX
may have had very little effect on the general rate at which public tar-
gets chose to remain Exchange Act reporting companies following a
going-private transaction.
D. Multivariate Analysis of the Use of High-yield Debt Financing
Notwithstanding these overall findings, it is important not to place
too great a weight on these aggregate figures, as they raise a number of
potential problems in testing the hypothesis that SOX has encouraged
companies to go private. In particular, the absence of any significant
difference in the rate at which public targets remained Exchange Act
reporting companies before and after SOX may be the result of other
differences between the two periods in question. But for these differ-
ences, post-SOX going-private transactions might reveal a larger pro-
portion of private bidders opting to avoid the burdens of the Ex-
change Act reporting requirements and, therefore, the costs of SOX.
Predicting exactly which variables influence private bidders to
become Exchange Act reporting companies (and, relatedly, how these
variables change over time) is beyond the scope of this Article, but
there are at least two variables of particular interest for the purposes
of this study. First, as noted above, several of the acquisitions in the pre-
SOX sample occurred during a period of remarkably high demand for
high-yield debt until Russia's debt default and the collapse of LTCM
in 1998. Data on high-yield issues after 2002 likewise suggests that
many of the going-private transactions after 2004 occurred during a
period of buoyant demand for high-yield debt among institutional
investors.57 To the extent robust credit markets encourage the use of
investment-grade corporate bonds widened dramatically, bringing an abrupt halt to the booming
corporate bond market. See id at 348.
57 See Mariarosa Verde, Paul Mancuso, and Eric Rosenthal, The Shrinking Default Rate
and the Credit Cycle-New Twists, New Risks 1 (Fitch Ratings Feb 20,2007), online at http://www.
fitchratings.com/corporate/reports/report-frame.cfm?rpt-id=314628 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (sub-
scription required) (documenting the increased debt taken on by a sampling of 260 US compa-
nies and the lower default rate on high-yield securities from 2004 to 2006).
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high-yield debt to finance a going-private transaction, the increased
rate at which companies went private but stayed public after 2002 might
simply reflect the strength of the post-SOX credit markets. In other
words, but for SOX, we might see considerably more going-private
transactions that were funded through an A/B Exchange Transaction
after 2002 than actually occurred.
Second, the debate about the costs of SOX requires an examina-
tion of one additional variable. Namely, the significant rate at which
private bidders opted to become Exchange Act reporting companies
after 2002 may stem from the well-documented trend of private-
equity firms to acquire ever larger public targets between 2004 and
2006.m If high-yield debt financing is a practical necessity to fund large
acquisitions, the presence of these larger transactions after 2003 might
require private-equity bidders to turn increasingly to high-yield debt
markets and, consequently, to A/B Exchange Transactions notwith-
standing their SOX implications. If true, the continued use of A/B Ex-
change Transactions after 2002 would, in turn, mask the extent to which
bidders in smaller acquisitions have opted to use SOX-free forms of
debt financing in lieu of high-yield debt financing. Stated differently,
our examination so far has ignored an important criticism often leveled
at SOX: that the cost of compliance is disproportionately higher for
smaller public companies. Might these disproportionate costs be en-
couraging smaller public companies to avoid, after 2002, going-private
structures that would subject them to SOX?
To understand these two considerations, it is important to establish
as a threshold matter whether there exists a relationship between the
use of an A/B Exchange Transaction and either of these two variables -
that is, the demand for high-yield debt or the size of a particular going-
private transaction. Table 5 presents a correlation matrix that confirms a
strong relationship in both cases for all going-private transactions in the
main sample (n = 468). Specifically, the second row of Table 5 reveals a
significant, negative correlation between whether a going-private trans-
action used an A/B Exchange Transaction and the credit spread for
high-yield bonds as of the closing date of each transaction.w Because
58 From 2004 to 2006, the average size of LBOs increased approximately 40 percent per year
from an average of $706 million in 2004 to $1.3 billion in 2006. See S&P Leveraged Commentary at
1 (cited in note 10) (documenting the average LBO size from 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2007).
59 See Edud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric L. Talley, Sarbanes-Oxley's Effects on
Small Firms: What is the Evidence? *3 (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No 588, June
2007), online at httpJ/ssm.com/abstract=993198 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (suggesting that SOX may have a
disproportionate effect on small companies because they have fewer resources and lower econo-
mies of scale, and receive less benefit from increased investor confidence than larger companies).
60 Credit spreads were measured as of the closing date for each going-private transaction by
taking the difference between Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield and the Ten-year Trea-
[76:7
Going Private but Staying Public
credit spreads for high-yield bonds narrow with greater demand for
high-yield debt securities, this relationship confirms a significant, posi-
tive correlation between whether a going-private transaction used an
A/B Exchange Transaction and the demand for high-yield bonds at the
time of the transaction. Likewise, using a target's book value of assets as
61
a proxy for transaction size, the third row of Table 5 reveals a strong,
positive correlation between the size of a target and whether the target
was acquired using an A/B Exchange Transaction.
TABLE 5
CORRELATION MATRIX EXAMINING INCIDENCE
OF A/B EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
This Table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for (1) whether a transaction uti-
lized an A/B Exchange Transaction ("A/B Exchange"); (2) the credit spread for high-
yield bonds as of the closing date of each transaction, measured by taking the difference
between Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield and the Ten-year Treasury Con-
stant Rate for such date (denoted "High-yield Spread"); (3) the natural log of the book
value of the target's assets as reported in the target's last SEC filing prior to the date of
acquisition ("Log(Assets)"); and (4) whether the transaction occurred during the period
2003-2006 (denoted "Post-SOX"). The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels
(p-values) of observing these coefficients by chance alone using two-tailed tests.
A/B Exchange High-yield Spread Log(Assets) Post-SOX
1.00
A/B Exchange
High-yield Spread -0.1694 1.00(0.000)
0.4167 -0.2342 1.00Log(Assets) (0.000) (0.000)
0.0475 -0.2620 0.1648 1.00(0.306) (0.000) (0.000)
In addition to confirming each of these two relationships, Table 5
also reveals how each of these variables changed before and after the
enactment of SOX. In particular, the fourth row in Table 5 indicates that
sury Constant Rate as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Compare Moody's Sea-
soned Baa Corporate Bond Yield, online at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DBAA?cid=
119 (visited Jan 11, 2009), with 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, online at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DGS10?cid=115 (visited Jan 11, 2009) (providing the daily yield rate for
Ten-year Treasury Bonds).
61 Data for each firm's book value of assets was collected from Compustat, in each case as
measured for the financial quarter immediately preceding the date of the going-private transac-
tion. Data for firms not included in Compustat was hand collected from EDGAR. As discussed
below, the majority of going-private transactions involved companies having less than $300 mil-
lion in total assets, which results in a positively skewed distribution of data. All analyses involv-
ing target assets were therefore done after a logarithmic transformation. The results in Table 3
are unchanged if the market value of target's delisted equity is used in lieu of target's total assets.
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a significant, positive correlation exists between whether a going-
private transaction occurred after 2002 and (1) the demand for high-
yield debt after 2002, and (2) the size of a target. These latter results
thus confirm the conventional wisdom that the period 2003-2006 was
characterized by both larger going-private transactions as well as strong
demand for high-yield debt. Consistent with the finding reported above,
however, Table 5 also shows no significant difference between the pe-
riods 1998-2001 and 2003-2006 in the rate at which going-private trans-
actions used an A/B Exchange Transaction. Overall, Table 5 is there-
fore highly suggestive that after 2002, the continued use of A/B Ex-
change Transactions in the face of SOX resulted from the fact that
private bidders increasingly turned to favorable high-yield markets to
fund ever-larger going-private transactions.
This conclusion is further supported by the dearth of small public
targets among those transactions that were financed with high-yield
debt. Table 6 breaks down the incidence of A/B Exchange Transactions
by target size within the sample of going-private transactions. Following
James Linck, Jeffry Netter, and iTma Yang, size categories were formed by
ranking the sample of target firms into quintiles based on their book val-
ue of assets. Firms were labeled "small" if they fell within the first two
quintiles and "medium" if they fell within quintiles three and four. To
isolate the effect that very large transactions might have on the overall
rate at which firms remained Exchange Act reporting companies, the
fifth quintile was divided into "large" and "very large" firms. Specifical-
ly, a firm was labeled "large" if it fell within the eightieth to ninetieth
percentile and "very large" if it fell above the ninetieth percentile. The
mean (median) book values of assets for small, medium, large, and very
large targets were $45.6 ($41.7) million, $221.27 ($193.0) million, $668.84
($664.33) million, and $4,027.8 ($1,970.8) million, respectively.
62 James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter, and Tina Yang, The Determinants of Board Structure, 87
J Fim Econ 308,316 (2008).
[76:7
Going Private but Staying Public
TABLE 6
INCIDENCE OF A/B EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS BY TARGET SIZE
This Table reports statistics on the percentage of transactions in the main sample of going-
private transactions (n = 468) that used an A/B Exchange Transaction, taking account of
the target's size and whether the transaction occurred before or after the enactment of
SOX. The actual number of transactions is included in brackets. "Pre-SOX" represents
transactions within the sample that occurred during the period 1998-2001; "Post-SOX"
represents transactions that occurred during the period 2003-2006. Differences be-
tween Pre-SOX and Post-SOX proportions were tested for statistical significance using
Fisher's exact test. The resulting p-values appear in the last column in parentheses.
Incidence of A/B Exchange Offers
Number of Targets in Sample within Each Target Size Category
Target Size: Pr
Small
Medium
Large
Very Large
e-SOX Post-SOX Total Pre-SOX
2.7%
113 75 188 [n = 3]
22.3%
112 75 187 [n = 25]
44%
25 21 46 [n = 11]
18.2%
11 36 47 [n = 2]
15.7%
Post-SOX Difference
0.0% -2.7%
[n = 0] (0.277)
16.0% -6.3%
[n = 121 (0.351)
38.1% -5.9%
[n = 8] (0.769)
55.6% 37.4%
[n = 20] (0.041)
19.3% 3.6%
Total 261 207 468 [n = 41] [n = 40] (0.326)
Table 6 shows that while small firms comprise nearly 40 percent of
the sample of going-private transactions (n = 188), they accounted for
only three of the eighty-one transactions that used an A/B Exchange
Transaction. A likely explanation for this finding is that high-yield of-
ferings have traditionally entailed higher fixed costs than other forms
of debt financing such as bank loans." Consequently, bidders should be
expected to avoid high-yield acquisition financing unless a transaction
is sufficiently large that these fixed costs can be amortized over a larg-
er deal value. Visual inspection of the entire sample suggests that this
inflection point prior to SOX probably occurred where a target had a
book value of assets greater than $75 million. If correct, Table 6 indi-
63 In addition to underwriting fees, issuers of high-yield debt must prepare offering docu-
ments and meet with prospective investors. In the case of an A/B Exchange Offer, there is also
the considerable expense of preparing a registration statement to be filed with the SEC and the
subsequent cost of making periodic Exchange Act filings. Because the direct costs of issuing
bonds tend to be fixed, they will consume a greater proportion of the total gross proceeds of a small
offering than a large offering. For instance, Inmoo Lee, et al, found that while the direct costs of an
underwritten noninvestment-grade bond offering consumed 2.90 percent of the proceeds where
an issuer raised more than $500 million, these direct costs consumed more than 4 percent of the
proceeds where an issuer raised less than $40 million in the offering. See Inmoo Lee, et al, The
Costs of Raising Capital, 19 J Fm Rsrch 59,66 (1996).
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cates that the enactment of SOX may very well have pushed higher
the inflection point whereby bidders begin considering the use of high-
yield financing. Whereas three acquisitions of small targets used high-
yield financing during 1998-2001, no acquisitions in this size category
used this form of financing during the period 2003-2006. Care must be
used in interpreting this result, however, as the difference is not statisti-
cally significant under conventional standards (p = 0.277, Fisher's exact;
p = 0.215, one-sided Fisher's exact). The finding is further hampered by
the low number of total observations of A/B Exchange Transactions
involving small targets.
Nonetheless, Table 6 clearly illustrates that the persistence in the
use of A/B Exchange Transactions before and after SOX was driven
primarily by the acquisitions of targets classified as medium, large, and
very large. The incidence of A/B Exchange Transactions among very
large targets is especially noteworthy. Whereas the rate of A/B Ex-
change Transactions fell slightly after SOX among small, medium, and
large targets, the rate significantly increased for acquisitions of very
large targets. For going-private transactions involving targets classified
as very large (that is, targets having assets greater than $985 million),
approximately 56 percent utilized an A/B Exchange Transaction after
2002. This difference in the incidence of A/B Exchange Transactions
after the enactment of SOX within each size category confirms a poss-
ible interaction between the effect of transaction size and the margin-
al costs of SOX. That is, the incremental costs of SOX might affect
differently the likelihood of using an A/B Exchange Transaction for
targets of varying sizes.
To better untangle the relationship between transaction size and
the effect of SOX on the incidence of A/B Exchange Transactions, I ran
a logistic regression using the full sample of going-private transactions
(n = 468). The dependent variable in the model was ABExchange,
which was set to 1 if the bidder executed the acquisition using an A/B
Exchange Transaction; otherwise, it was set to 0. To measure the effect
of SOX on the use of A/B Exchange Transactions, I included in the
model an independent dummy variable called POSTSOX, which was
coded as 1 if the transaction occurred during 2003-2006 and 0 if it oc-
curred during 1998-2001. To control for the influence of transaction
size on the decision of whether to use an A/B Exchange Transaction, I
also included an independent variable reflecting the size of target-
specifically, whether it was coded as small, medium, large, or very large
using the classification criteria described previously. To control for the
strong demand for high-yield notes during the period 2003-2006, an
independent, continuous variable called HIGHYIELDSPREAD
was used. This variable was set at the spread for high-yield bonds as of
the closing date for each going-private transaction and mean-centered
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for each observation. Finally, to control for unmeasured variation in the
use of high-yield debt financing across industries, industry fixed effects
were also included (as measured by Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) division codes).
For the primary regression, ABExchange was regressed on each
of the three independent variables, controlling for industry fixed effects.
If the transaction size and the state of the high-yield debt market influ-
ence whether a bidder uses an A/B Exchange Transaction, the intuition
is that controlling for these variables in the regression should reveal a
clearer picture of how the costs of SOX have affected the decision to
use high-yield debt financing. Specifically, if the conventional analysis
of SOX and going-private transactions is correct, a negative relation-
ship should exist in the regression between POSTSOX and whether a
transaction used an A/B Exchange Transaction.
To test the potential interaction between the size of the transac-
tion and the costs of SOX, I also ran three additional specifications. In
each, POSTSOX was interacted with one of the target size categories
(that is, medium, large, and very large) to determine what effect, if any,
the costs of SOX have had on the decision to use an A/B Exchange
Transaction for acquisitions within each size category. To the extent
these categories represent qualitatively different types of transactions,
these interactions allow an examination of how SOX has affected the
use of A/B Exchange Transactions on an apples-to-apples basis. The
results of all regressions are reported in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
INCIDENCE OF A/B EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS-
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
This Table reports regression estimates on the association between a bidder's decision to
use an A/B Exchange Transaction, whether the transaction occurred before or after
SOX, the strength of the high-yield credit markets, and transaction size. Additionally, all
regression models control for industry fixed effects. The dependent variable in all models is
ABEXCHANGE, set to 1 if the acquisition used an A/B Exchange Transaction and 0
otherwise. Statistical significance is indicated by * at 90 percent confidence; ** at 95
percent confidence; and *** at 99 percent confidence. All models are run as probit regres-
sions and include a constant term (not reported). Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Model Number 1 2 3 4
POSTSOX -0.22 (0.18) -0.09 (0.27) -0.19 (0.19) -0.36 (0.19)*
Controls:
Target Size:
Medium 1.31 (0.27)*** 1.38 (0.29)*** 1.30 (0.27)*** 1.32 (0.27)***
Large 1.96 (0.31)*** 1.94 (0.31)*** 2.02 (0.36)*** 1.98 (0.31)***
Very Large 2.08 (0.32)*** 2.03 (0.33)*** 2.07 (0.32)*** 1.18 (0.52)**
High-yield Spread -0.47 (0.19)** -0.46 (0.19)** -0.47 (0.19)** -0.43 (0.19)**
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Interaction:
Medium*POSTSOX 
-0.22 (0.34)
Large*POSTSOX 
-0.14 (0.42)
Very Large*POSTSOX 1.23 (0.53)**
Number of Observations 468 468 468 468
McFadden's Pseudo R-squared 0.2256 0.2266 0.2259 0.2391
Table 7 sheds considerable light on the relationship among trans-
action size, SOX, and the decision to use an A/B Exchange Transaction.
In the first model, the coefficients for each target size category are all
positive and highly significant as well as increasing in magnitude with
each size category, as expected. Because all models were run as a probit,
the coefficients reflect the effect on a cumulative normal distribution
function of the probability (measured in probit units) that a going-private
transaction would use an A/B Exchange Transaction. The strength of
the relationship between transaction size and the use of an A/B Ex-
change Transaction can also be expressed in terms of the probability
that a transaction would use an A/B Exchange Transaction, which pro-
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vides a more intuitive understanding of the relationship.6 Specifically,
regardless of whether a transaction occurred prior to or after SOX, the
probability that a small target in a going-private transaction would use an
A/B Exchange Transaction ranged from only 3 to 5 percent, holding con-
stant the high-yield credit spread at its mean.u In contrast, these probabil-
ities increased to between 30 and 38 percent for transactions involving
medium targets and to between 55 and 64 percent for transactions in-
volving large targets. For targets classified as very large, the probabilities
that a going-private transaction would use an A/B Exchange Transac-
tion were between 60 and 68 percent. Similarly strong and significant
coefficients for each size category are found in the three other models.
Likewise, all four models reveal a significant, negative relation-
ship between the use of an A/B Exchange Transaction and the high-
yield credit spread at the time of a transaction. Again, given that yield
spreads move in the opposite direction as bond prices, this finding sug-
gests a strong, positive relationship between demand for high-yield
notes at the time of a going-private transaction and the use of an A/B
Exchange Transaction.
In contrast, the relationship between SOX and the decision to use
an A/B Exchange Transaction is less pronounced. In the first three
models, the coefficients for POSTSOX are each negative (as predicted
by the hypothesis) but not significant under conventional standards.
Moreover, the coefficients in all three models are modest in size. For
instance, in the primary model, the reported coefficient of -0.22 indi-
cates that the probability of using an A/B Exchange Transaction in
64 The relationship between probit units (y) and the probability (P) that ABExchange =1
is given by the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution, or Oy):
P(AB _Exchange = 1) = D(y) = 2 )du
65 The marginal effect of transaction size on the use of an A/B Exchange Transaction is
reflected as a range of values due to the underlying mathematics of converting a probit unit into
a measure of probability. As the first model in Table 5 indicates, an increase in transaction size
has a purely linear increase in probit units; however, using 0(y) to transform the probit scale into
a measure of probability creates a nonlinear relationship between the predicted probit and the
probability of using an A/B Exchange Transaction. Moreover, because the size of the predicted
probit will turn on both transaction size and the measure of the other independent variables in
the model, the marginal effect of transaction size will be conditional on the value of the other inde-
pendent variables. See William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis § 19.3.1 (Prentice Hall 3d ed 1997).
In light of this issue, it is common to compute the marginal effect of a single discrete variable in a
probit model by holding all other variables constant at their means. In the present case, however,
such an approach is unhelpful where so many variables represent discrete categories and would
therefore provide the marginal effect of transaction size for a transaction that never existed (that
is, no transaction took place with an average of POSTSOX or an average of the medium size cate-
gory). Accordingly, I present the marginal effect of transaction size as a range of values based on the
actual transactions in the sample, holding constant at its mean only the high-yield spread.
20091
The University of Chicago Law Review
2003-2006 was only one-fifth to one-eighth less than the probability of
using an A/B Exchange Transaction in 1998-2001 for targets classified
as medium, large, and very large after controlling for the demand for
high-yield debt. Similarly weak and insignificant coefficients appear
for both POSTSOX and the interaction of POSTSOX in Models 2 and
3, where POSTSOX was interacted with the target size categories me-
dium and large. These results suggest that even after controlling for
transaction size, there is no reason to believe that just because a particu-
lar transaction occurred after SOX was enacted, there was any greater
or less probability that it would use an A/B Exchange Transaction.
In light of these findings, Model 4 presents something of a surprise.
As in all cases, the coefficients for each target-size category are strongly
significant and positive. The interaction of POSTSOX and the very
large size category, however, indicates that for acquisitions involving
targets with more than $985 million in total assets, the probability of
conducting an A/B Exchange Transaction was actually higher after the
enactment of SOX. Specifically, for very large targets, the probability
of using an A/B Exchange Transaction after 2002 was over twice the
probability of using an A/B Exchange Transaction prior to 2002 after
controlling for the condition of the high-yield debt market.67
Moreover, controlling for this interaction alters the effect of
POSTSOX. In Model 4, the negative coefficient for POSTSOX is not
only larger than in the primary model, it is also marginally significant
(p = 0.06). In terms of the probability of using an A/B Exchange Trans-
action, the reported coefficient of -0.36 on POSTSOX in Model 4 indi-
cates that the probability of using an A/B Exchange Transaction after
2002 was approximately 3 percent lower for targets classified as small,
13 percent lower for targets classified as medium, and 14 percent low-
er for targets classified as large. In short, it is only by controlling for the
greater likelihood of using an A/B Exchange Transaction associated
with very large buyouts after SOX that it becomes possible to detect
any meaningful decrease in the likelihood that a going-private transac-
tion would be financed with an A/B Exchange Transaction after SOX.6
66 I further analyzed the interactions in Models 2 and 3 using the Stata command INTEFF
recommended in Edward C. Norton, Hua Wang, and Chunrong Ai, Computing Interaction Ef-
fects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models, 4 Stata J 154 (2004) (describing how to use
the INTEFF command to determine the interaction effect between variables in a probit specifi-
cation when some of the variables are noncontinuous dummy variables). The INTEFF analysis
confirmed the absence of a significant interaction between POSTSOX and the medium and large
size categories for all observations in the data set.
67 As with the interactions in Models 2 and 3,1 used the INTEFF command to confirm that
the interaction in Model 4 was both significant and positive for all observations in the dataset.
68 In an unreported regression, I ran the same probit specification used in Model 4 but
replaced the target size categories with the mean-centered log of target assets and interacted this
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CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, understanding the relation-
ship between the costs of SOX and the sharp rise in going-private
transactions after 2002 requires considerably more refinement than
has traditionally been afforded the subject. Given that a company can
remain subject to SOX after it goes private due to the use of high-
yield debt to finance the transaction, accurate analysis of this relation-
ship requires assessing whether companies have increasingly gone
private with SOX-free forms of financing rather than simply the rela-
tive frequency with which companies have gone private at all.
Using this more refined approach, this Article has revealed that
the large-scale take-private transactions that are so often cited as proof
that SOX is driving companies to go private have generally failed to
remove firms from the domain of SOX. Indeed, I find that after SOX,
private bidders are actually more likely to subject themselves to con-
tinuing SEC reporting obligations (which now include SOX's disclo-
sure obligations) when structuring a large-scale take-private transac-
tion than prior to SOX. Rather, it is only for small- and medium-sized
public companies in which SOX appears to have encouraged firms
considering a going-private transaction to turn increasingly to SOX-
free forms of financing.
At their most general level, these empirical findings therefore
provide considerable evidence that the wave of large-scale buyouts that
swept the US economy during 2003-2007 was not driven by the costs of
SOX. At the same time, however, they also seem to confirm the wide-
spread concern that SOX has been particularly burdensome on small-
and medium-sized public companies. Yet in extending this latter finding
to the broader debate about the relationship between SOX and the
competitiveness of US capital markets, it is also important to emphas-
ize the need for caution. Notwithstanding the attention given to the
increased rate of take-private transactions since SOX, there is nothing
inherently problematic with capital market regulations that deter
some firms from issuing securities (equity or debt) that are intended to
be publicly traded. As noted by Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic,
and Eric Talley, the very objective of securities regulations-SOX in-
cluded-might be to minimize the public trading of securities of those
firms that are prone to financial fraud. 6 Focusing exclusively on how
term with POSTSOX. Analysis of the model using the INTEFF command confirmed that the
marginal effect of this interaction was positive and significant for most of the observations that
fell within the very large size category.
69 See Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley, Going-private Decisions at 27 (cited in note 9)
(noting that the "exodus of small firms from the public capital market" due to SOX costs would
be a desired effect of SOX if these firms were more prone to financial fraud).
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SOX has encouraged some types of companies to go private thus risks
emphasizing how these firms perceive its compliance costs while over-
looking how investors (and even other firms) might view its benefits
in terms of fraud detection and prevention.
In this regard, the findings presented here suggest an intriguing
possibility about the perceived benefits of SOX. For all the criticism
that has been leveled at SOX for mandating a rigid, one-size-fits-all
approach to fraud detection, it bears emphasizing that the high-yield
debt market is fundamentally the product of private contractual rela-
tionships. Indeed, the promulgation of Rule 144A was intended to
open the way for issuers and institutional investors to establish an ac-
tive market for high-yield debt that would be immune from the man-
datory reporting obligations associated with publicly traded equity
securities. That the market responded with privately negotiated inden-
tures obligating issuers to comply with these reporting obligations is
therefore telling evidence of the value institutional investors place on
a firm's commitment to comply with the Exchange Act's disclosure
requirements. For similar reasons, the persistence of this covenant af-
ter 2002 may very well reflect institutional investors' desire to opt into
the SOX regulatory regime and thereby benefit from its additional
compliance obligations.
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